Nigeria’s Police Work between International Reform Ideas and National Security Arrangements by Müller, Nina
www.ssoar.info
Nigeria’s Police Work between International Reform
Ideas and National Security Arrangements
Müller, Nina
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Arbeitspapier / working paper
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung (HSFK)
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Müller, N. (2020). Nigeria’s Police Work between International Reform Ideas and National Security Arrangements.
(PRIF Working Papers, 48). Frankfurt am Main: Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung. https://nbn-
resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-69033-6
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
Nigeria’s Police Work between 
International Reform Ideas 
and National Security Arrange-
ments
Nina Müller
Juni 2020
No. 48
W
or
ki
ng
 P
ap
er
s
1 
 
PRIF Working Paper No. 48 
 
Nigeria’s Police Work between International Reform 
Ideas and National Security Arrangements 
 
Nina Müller 
 
 
In the medium-income neighborhood in Northern Lagos where I was staying during part of 
my fieldwork, private guards patrolled the streets every night. During my first night, I was 
awakened around midnight by a very loud noise outside the house. It seemed to be close by on 
the street. I identified the disturbance as wood hitting against steel, but I still did not know its 
source. When my host told me the next day that it was caused by patrolling night guards who 
secure the area, I felt relieved. The so-called vigilantes1 made regular rhythmic rapping sound 
at the same hour every night to signal their presence and at the same time to discourage 
potential criminals. After that, it put my mind at ease anytime I heard the noise outside. Even 
when I woke up every night I had the feeling that I was in a safe environment, because the 
vigilantes were at work on behalf of the neighborhood. Over time, this reality became more 
and more familiar to me. The experience allowed me, on the one hand, to become personally 
more sensitive to the dimensions of the country’s current (inadequate) security situation. On 
the other hand, I could more concretely imagine what the almost ubiquitous absence of 
statehood in general means. Additionally I started to understand the relevance of self-
organization in terms of practical security provisions for individuals. In general, providing 
security is a current, overarching and highly discussed topic in Nigeria. 
1  INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
This paper explores local perceptions of selected elements within Nigeria’s police reform. The 
Nigerian state-society relationship is characterized by deep-rooted shortcomings within the 
national security arrangements, e.g., distrust between uniformed representatives of state power and 
citizens and a shortage of adequate equipment and lack of moral orientation are decisive factors 
(Isima/Okenyodo 2009: 42). The Nigerian police are at the center of attention in terms of internal 
security provision, and the police officers act as the first representatives of the state. Its obvious 
failure to provide a minimum of essential protection to its citizens and respect for detainees’ rights 
(HRW 2005; Prawa 2016) is visible in daily encounters, when the consequences of people’s 
behavior or self-representation in general are ignored. Conducting research on Nigerian policing 
actors reveals how the actions of officers “[…] reflect[s] the political and economic character of [a] 
society” and also shows what “those in power are willing or able to tolerate or condone” (Oladipo 
2013: 79). A multitude of international donors, national security institutions, public commissions 
and agencies as well as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) aim at improving the security 
sector with the help of theoretical and practical knowledge about human rights and lessons learned 
from so-called “best practices.” 
 
Since the end of military rule in 1999, Nigeria’s government has focused on police reforms 
concerning most notably issues such as human rights violations involving the torturing of suspects, 
extrajudicial killings or the absence of victim protection (Alemika/Chukwuma 2000: 57–58). At a 
technical level, inappropriate equipment, insufficient quality control (and transparency) of 
recruitment processes and promotions, delays in paying salaries and lack of functionality of 
internal and external oversight institutions have been identified as obstacles in Nigeria’s security 
                                                                
1  The existence of vigilantes is a global phenomenon (Pratten/Sen 2007). 
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sector2. In addition, general underfunding as well as the deficient financial and infrastructural 
organization of the police force are generally perceived as some of the main reasons for the security 
agents’ lack of professionalism or their involvement in corruption. Alice Hills labels police reform 
efforts as a waltz (2008: 217), which makes no decisive steps forward and has a superficial veneer. 
The point I want to make is different, because I will focus on the issue of how the ideas of reform 
and the knowledge applied (including practices) are faring on the ground (repercussions). There 
are individual decisions and scope for decision-making and patterns of implementation processes 
which reveal which aspects are incorporated, modified or disabled. I present a spectrum of 
behaviors, from mimicry to rejection, in order to show the heterogeneity of the field and, in 
addition to state reform efforts, also show how the individual circumstances and partialities also 
play a role. 
 
In the following, I will first analyze the extent to which these efforts to achieve change are 
understood and discussed by different actors at a local level in terms of the theoretical and practical 
meaning of human rights. Secondly, I will focus on what occurs when “best practices” are 
integrated into already existing security architecture. This has been characterized primarily by 
informality and the absence (or selective application) of state institutions’ accountability and an 
existing parallel structure. Different visions of policing coexist and a lack of communication makes 
preparation and implementation of sustainable changes impossible. I argue that both national and 
international reform attempts have not yet managed to profoundly change the service delivery of 
the Nigerian police because the diversity of local needs and perceptions has not been considered 
sufficiently. 
 
The research on which my analysis is based took place over seven months of fieldwork in Nigeria 
between 2013 and 2016. There, I mainly concentrated on activities in the field of “community 
policing” and on the introduction of so-called “Model Police Stations” (MPS) in Lagos in 
particular3. The new ideas and norms adopted in these specific stations were intended to be put 
into practice not only by the police officers in charge, but also by informal security providers 
organized by residents’ associations, local leaders or local government associations such as 
community development associations (CDA), which see themselves as self-help organizations for 
improving infrastructure and living conditions in their neighborhoods. Consequently, the MPS 
project makes available research opportunities for observing the interplay between international, 
national and local actors and studying their different practices and forms of cooperation. The 
discourse on how best to achieve the intended role shift from a reactive to a proactive style among 
police officers shows that these reform endeavors, which are mostly based on international norms 
such as respect for human rights, cannot be treated as isolated elements within the security sector. I 
will show that specific aspects (such as new methods for handling evidence or treatment of cases 
according to international standards of human rights) are not really addressing the urgent needs of 
                                                                
2  See Police Service Commission, Ministry of Police Affairs (Tsokar 2015; Sahara Reporters 2016a) or the disciplinary 
mechanisms of the police which do not work (Isima 2011). 
3  My fieldwork was divided into two main phases and extended from 2013 to 2016, with one Skype interview done in 
2017. Altogether, I conducted around 60 interviews and several talks with relevant actors in the field I entered the field 
by attending an academic conference on security challenges in 2012 and working as an intern at a Nigerian-based 
nongovernmental organization in early 2013. There, I was able, on the one hand, to obtain an overview of the NGO’s 
own ongoing projects and methods of operation, the staff’s personal motivation for working in this sector, and also to 
learn about the obstacles they are confronted with in this politically sensitive field. On the other hand, I formed an 
impression of other relevant actors and ongoing projects within the reform arena at a national level. Furthermore, I was 
able to establish a personal network with other NGOs, police officers, non-state security actors and representatives of 
international donor agencies which fund programs. In a second extended stay in 2015 I conducted the more in-depth 
two-and-a-half month phase of my data collection with a focus on different areas in Lagos. During this stay I worked 
with a research assistant to be more flexible and less dependent on the NGO’s movements and activities, in 2013 also in 
part due to the security situation in the country. I also conducted some follow-up interviews in early 2016. 
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local recipients and so-called “partners.” On the other hand, they do not pay sufficient attention to 
local expertise and the experience of non-police actors’ networks and their performance in security 
provision. One net effect is that well-intended interventions and programs are often applied 
superficially, with little impact on the structural deficiencies at the core of the institution. 
 
The paper focuses on everyday coping strategies with regard to the contradictory aspect of the 
artificial situation by focusing on forms of implementation or non-implementation of human 
rights in daily working procedures. In a first step, background information will be provided 
concerning the institution of the police and the reasons for the necessity of reform endeavors. To 
complete the picture of relevant actors, I will also provide an overview of other (informal or 
voluntary) security providers, such as the vigilante groups mentioned above (e.g., neighborhood 
watches or night guards). I will also briefly discuss an alternative form of police reform that is 
practiced in the Greater Lagos area without international involvement or consultancy. This 
example of local self-help reflects a very critical opinion of the idea that universal norms and 
globally spread “best practice” examples should form a new way of policing. For one thing there 
are crucial differences between the aims and goals of many internationally funded and designed 
programs, and the priorities of target groups. This introductory mapping of factors will be 
followed by ethnographic observations in which the newly learned human rights norms are 
implemented in examples from a policing context. 
 
For these purposes, we will examine different actors’ perspectives, their motivation, aims, 
expectations and experiences. Whether looking at the views of international consultants, Nigerian 
police officers, local vigilante groups, local and religious leaders, ordinary citizens or committed 
NGOs, all these perspectives highlight particular moments within the “translation” processes 
(Kaufmann/Rottenburg 2012). By using the concept of the “traveling model” (Behrends et al. 
2014), I treat “community policing” as a global model, which is modified and then translated 
locally in the Nigerian context. The “traveling model” serves as an instrument for analyzing global 
processes and their social effects in different contexts. First I briefly discuss the political context 
shaped by national and international interests and policies which influenced the history of the 
police reform sector, before presenting my empirical findings. 
2 THE DEVELOPMENT AND STATE OF NIGERIA‘S POLICE SECTOR  
Although the police are the central security institution in Nigeria and immediately tangible for 
everyone, I will briefly describe the Nigerian security institutions to show the relevance of the topic 
at a regional level and the possible range of impacts on the West African state4. Here, I want to 
draw attention to how closely linked these sectors are. Since the end of military rule in Nigeria 
(1999) the focus of security reform efforts, which started in 2002, has been on the police and justice 
sector, and has been implemented mostly in bilateral cooperation. After the return to democracy, 
the newly elected state president Olusegun Obasanjo implemented highly symbolic military 
reforms with the support of private US companies. Changes only occurred to a minor extent 
(Rüland/Manea 2013: 15, 67) and were exclusively driven by the military, without input from the 
civil society (Born 2013: 234). After the police had been neglected and largely marginalized during 
nearly 30 years of military rule, after 1999 there was a clear need for an overall transformation in 
order to develop a security structure that corresponded with the democratic constitution.  
                                                                
4  The Nigerian army can be seen as a strong and major force in international organizations like the African Union (AU) 
and ECOWAS in terms of both quality and quantity. At the moment there are no concrete national reform 
propositions for tackling the institution’s problems. However, within the justice sector, in addition to police reform 
there are ongoing reform programs, which mainly concentrate on, for example, the improvement of human rights 
promotion in prisons and on speeding up trials. 
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Following independence in 1960, the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) emerged from the colonial police 
(Tamuno 1970), which had primarily pursued the British colonizers’ commercial, political and 
strategic objectives and (due to the colonial ideology) did little to serve the interests of the Nigerian 
general population (Odinkalu 2004: 38; Odinkalu 2008: 39, 42, 70; Rotimi 2001). Even the post-
independence political elites focused on regime protection rather than on the promotion of rights 
and welfare for everyone or on building up a state to protect and serve the citizens. For a better 
understanding, it is important to stress that  
 
“[…] the Nigerian Police Force (NPF) saw itself as a tool of government that was used to 
wage war against the people. As a result, it became a ready instrument in the hands of 
regimes wishing to coerce any perceived opposition.” (Abiodun 2000: 30) 
 
Thus, it had not been prepared for the challenges of the post-colonial situation. Since the late 1970s 
Nigerian police officers had been confronted with a high level of violence resulting from various 
ethnic and religious conflicts, and more recently from the rise of new and diverse criminal activities5. 
The polarity between civil society and police is still evident today and is one reason for the non-
existence of an efficient police institution (Odinkalu 2004: 38; Odinkalu 2008). Hence, the Nigerian 
Police Force lacks fundamental popular trust (Alemika/Chukwuma 2013: 31–33) due to the political 
abuse of power during the periods of military rule (1966–79, 1983–98) that has weakened the internal 
hierarchy within the security sector. Police and military duties are blurred. The Nigerian Police Force 
(NPF) is a federal institution under the 1999 constitution, headed by the Inspector General of Police 
(IGP), and has seven departments (NPF 2017). The Force Headquarters are situated in the capital, 
Abuja, and organized along the territorial/administrative structures of the country down to village 
police posts (HRW 2010: 18–19). Because of the complex, manipulation-prone and lengthy 
bureaucratic procedures, some commentators believe that policing should be the duty of the states 
and not the federal government in order to fulfil the promise of real federalism according to the 
constitution (Obidimma/Obidimma 2015). Other critics of this issue often argue for total revision 
and restructuring towards a three-tier police system at national, regional and local levels in order to 
have a more adequate (and faster) operational structure. This could enable each state’s police to 
respond to local crime activities locally. 
 
Apart from special forces within the NPF6, since the mid-1980s, more and more state institutions 
and commissions have been established and strengthened or weakened, depending on the 
priorities emphasized. These structures are intended to restore security and order (e.g., Road 
Safety, Police Community Relations Committee, Nigeria Security and Civil Defense Corps, 
National Drug Law Enforcement Agency). Their function is to fill the gap resulting from 
inadequate police services or management performance and the obvious failure to improve the 
situation. Indeed, federalism has complicated the situation and raises questions of responsibility 
and legality. Furthermore, the increasing army takeover of internal security duties and in this way 
police functions (decrease in operating range), such as the fight against Boko Haram terrorism 
mainly in the Northeast, or the Niger Delta militants in the South South region of the country, 
implies institutional dysfunction. 
 
However, as I indicated earlier, Nigerian domestic security is not only the state’s domain. Rather, 
local and religious leaders, community associations and consensus-based mechanisms for problem 
                                                                
5  For example, Boko Haram in the North East, the Niger Delta conflict on oil revenues in the South East, indigene-settler 
conflicts over land in the Middle Belt or organized transnational crime, as well as fraud and cybercrime. 
6  As examples, I will mention two of these forces: MOPOL = Nigerian Mobil Police Against Riots, or SARS (Special 
Anti-Robbery Squad), which were established in order to tackle crime (Amnesty International 2016). 
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solving are common. Additionally, informal neighborhood patrol groups, so called vigilante 
groups, are widespread all across the country, and the anecdote about my neighborhood at the 
beginning of this paper is not an isolated case. Such groups are frequently commissioned by 
neighborhood associations7. Vigilante groups are unstable organizations, which are difficult to 
define or to classify. From the 1990s to the 2000s, a large increase in their numbers took place 
(Harnischfeger 2001, 2003, 2010). This can be seen as proof of locally entrenched parallel security 
(and justice) systems (Meagher 2007; Nolte 2007; Adamu 2008; Abdulazeez 2013). Their self-
ascribed and popularly confirmed incorruptibility – due to their informal status – in many cases 
enhances their trustworthiness and reliability in the eyes of many Nigerian civilians (Harnischfeger 
2003: 31; Smith 2004: 411). These and other groups form an integral part of guarded 
neighborhoods, although some of them (e.g., members of the now illegal militia groups O’odua 
People’s Congress or Bakassi Boys) do not necessarily live in the same areas, while others (local 
vigilante or night guards) do8. Furthermore, they are sometimes personally involved within the 
neighborhood itself, which exactly opposes the perceived image of average police officers, whose 
interest is often believed to be led by self-serving motives and assumed lack of interest in the 
fulfillment of their actual task9. The informal guards and the way they fight crime enjoy 
widespread support from the residents of the communities, according to my Lagos informants. 
The vigilantes’ style of treating suspects, though not legal, is immediate and effective and is well 
accepted– at least in comparison with the frustrations people encounter daily with police 
personnel. 
3 INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND INTENDED CHANGE 
The work of national and international actors in police reform cannot be described as a united 
endeavor. Rather it is a heterogeneous field where partly different practices and partly distinct 
interests clash. I will therefore present and analyse the kinds of actors which operate at the local, 
national and international level in order to make the reform arena’s composition more 
comprehensible and to demonstrate the complexity of the way ideas circulate 
(Czarniawska/Joerges 1996). 
3.1 Police Reform Attempts since 1999 
The first reform efforts started after the end of military rule. Later rebranded as Security Sector 
Reform, these efforts have endured until today. Olusegun Obasanjo, president from 1999–200710, 
established reform programs, partially with foreign assistance11 (Ikuteyijo/Rotimi 2012: 126; Hills 
2012). At the beginning of the transition toward democracy, the president and his government 
paid more attention to economic revitalization and growth as a development strategy. However, 
instead of focusing on institutions and their specific structural problems, the president focused on 
clearing up personnel issues. For instance, he ordered the massive recruitment of 40,000 police 
officers annually for five years, without raising the budget (HRW 2010: 17). Since then, the police 
authority has consistently established different agendas for changing internal as well as external 
requirements – for example, interaction with the people including dealing with the people’s issues 
– but these have rarely been implemented in practice (Baker 2008: 68; Hills 2012: 743–744, 751). 
                                                                
7  In my specific research, I focus on small and locally very active vigilante groups, who work in Lagos neighborhoods and 
vary in composition, scope of function and autonomy. 
8  This was the case at least in the localities involved in my field research. 
9  This is not the case everywhere, but in the neighborhoods where I worked. 
10  Obasanjo was not president at the time of the transition to democracy, but president of the Fourth Republic. First: 
1963–1966, second: 1979–1983, third: 1993. 
11  This assistance was offered mainly by US and UK governments. 
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To improve the poor public image of the police, the people in charge of the force, namely the IGP, 
established different agendas. These focused more on quantity in terms of personnel or other 
obviously unattainable targets. IGP Musiliu Smith (in office 1999–2002), for instance, claimed to 
“redeem […] the ‘lost glory’ of the police as well as improving the welfare of officers” 
(Ikuteyijo/Rotimi 2012: 126) and Sunday Ehindero (IGP from 2005–2007) pursued the same goal 
with his seemingly democratic motto “To serve and protect with integrity.” 
 
Generally speaking, all holders of this position pursued an “x-point agenda”12 to distinguish 
themselves from each other (Ikuteyijo/Rotimi 2012: 126). At the same time some of those assigned 
to the task of reforming the police sector, such as many IGPs, were accused of theft (Akinrujomu 
2016; Sahara Reporters 2016b; The Nigerian Voice 2014). This caused regular public outcry and 
harmed the image of the police in the long term. Including but not limited to this, the security 
situation now does not seem to have changed much. Human rights advocate Innocent Chukwuma 
(2008) called it “motion without movement.” Especially the police’s apparent helpless reaction to 
the Islamic group Boko Haram – the responsibility was eventually handed over to the military – 
illustrates a lack of efficiency, professionalism and, as a general consequence, a lack of state 
legitimacy (CSO Panel 2012). Apart from this, problems arose concerning internal police 
organization. The president appoints the IGP (CSO Panel 2012: 10), who in turn is supposed to put 
the reforms into practice. Although the will to implement reforms aiming at the shift from reactive 
to preventive police procedures was repeatedly voiced during president Obasanjo’s rule, no 
concrete progress was ever made. A human rights activist put it this way: 
 
“Because the political authorities are thinking of a police that can serve their interest, a 
police that they can use to weak election. Not a police that can serve the people, not a police 
that can disobey on lawful orders. It is actually a lack of political will to implement general 
reforms. It is because the political authorities are thinking about a police that will protect 
the state rather than the people.” (Interview Taiwo, Lagos, March 2013)13. 
 
As a result of the repeatedly cited resistance against reform agendas at high levels14 within the 
police, implementation of reforms was stopped, conducted in a halfhearted way or not even 
started. In view of all these efforts, political analyst Alice Hills concluded that without a 
fundamental change in general politics, reforms will be put in practice only at a superficial level 
and without sustainable effect (Hills 2008: 227). To sum it up, since the end of military rule, several 
strategies have been implemented for solving this problem of institutional inertia. However, the 
ideas have mostly remained on paper or focused on desultory internal restructuring, for instance, 
by simply increasing the number of officers without a holistic concept or revising police college 
curricula. Thus, the problems still exist. Nigerian political authorities continue to emphasize the 
importance of reforming the security environment in order to deliver more protection in several 
areas, but in the public opinion and everyday experience there are no relevant and sustainable 
positive effects or at best only few. 
                                                                
12  I will mention just a few to show the variety of priorities, such as Tafa Balogun’s, Inspector General of Police from 
2002–2005, eight-point agenda ‘Fire to fire’ to oppose well-armed robbers. 
13  Most of the persons and names of research sites of my research mentioned in this text have been made anonymous. 
14  Many lower level civil servants in the police sector fear possible negative consequences of deeply-rooted police reform, 
and fear loss of power and illicit income. I obtained this information from informal talks with Nigerian journalists, 
human rights activists and academics (author’s field notes). 
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3.2 Local Initiatives with a Different Flavor 
Apart from the reform attempts (or claimed attempts) controlled by the federal police institution, 
alternative strategies are pursued in local initiatives. These are tolerated or even actively supported 
by the IGP (or international donors) in terms of conceptual expertise or funding. One outstanding 
example is the “Lagos State Security Trust Fund” (LSSTF) founded in 2007. This public-private 
partnership was established at the state level to assist the underfunded and underequipped police 
force to fulfil its assigned tasks: The emphasis is on equipment such as vehicles, radios, bulletproof 
vests, etc., and on control of the equipment’s adequate use all over the state15. The former governor 
reacted in this way to many rank and file police officers’ complaints that lack of equipment was the 
most important reason for their poor performance and work morale:  
 
“Let’s start with the basics, give the men the ability to police the area under their 
jurisdiction first, then we can hold them accountable when they fail.” (Interview Executive 
Secretary LSSTF, Lagos, July 2015). 
 
Independently of federal and state authorities, a board of trustees controls the financial revenues 
from companies like telecommunication firms and banks that support the fund. Distribution of the 
material provided is documented and published regularly, and generates public trust. This 
initiative is bearing fruit in the form of falling crime rates in general, as well as fewer kidnappings 
and bank robberies, which used to happen on a daily base in the commercial hub of Lagos ten 
years ago16. The initiators make a clear statement which can be understood as harsh criticism of 
the formal SSR activities. Human rights are seen as secondary and even as unsuitable for the 
current situation of the police force in Lagos: 
 
“So it will work psychologically. If you don’t give them [the police officers] the right 
equipment they are just wasting time. They are ready to work. All this model project [...] I 
just don’t understand it, but you know the West will tell you that: They don’t give hard 
equipment because of human rights concerns. I say, alright, well, that is the way you look at 
it but we that are here, we know what the real problems are.” (Interview Executive Secretary 
LSSTF, Lagos, July 2015). 
 
In the interview, this man declared that he did not reject respect of human rights per se. Rather, 
this dimension of “good policing” would have to play a subordinate role in the current volatile 
situation. Thus, he admitted that this kind of solution cannot change the system per se, but at least 
mitigates the high level of crime in the state, even though it is not seen as a conclusive solution for 
the police’s problems. The idea of the Trust Fund has been replicated in other states of the 
federation, something which can be seen as a sign of success (personal responsibility of certain 
politicians or governors). 
3.3 International and Transnational Actors 
The Nigerian reform arena is fragmented and complex. Its diverse actors at different levels are not 
necessarily familiar with each other’s activities in detail. To prevent repetition, informal 
agreements between the international donor organizations are a common practice. At the 
international level supranational actors like UNODC17 and UNICEF concentrate on 
                                                                
15  Additionally, two patrol vehicles were delivered to each of the 106 police stations in Lagos to support the frequently 
lacking mobility of police officers. 
16  Akinwunmi Ambode was elected as Fashola’s successor in 2015 and he stated his intention of continuing this initiative. 
17  United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. 
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“modernizing” including sensitization for fair treatment of people or adequate handling of 
firearms (UNODC 2017). Beside this, bilateral actors are active, most notably the British18, but also 
Canadians, Swiss and Germans19, who operate small programs financed by their respective 
development agencies, focusing mainly on the implementation of human rights in the officers’ 
everyday interaction with citizens and on professionalization of skills. International development 
agencies are following a two-fold methodological approach in collaboration with Nigerian 
authorities: at a national and at a community level. In concrete terms, at the national level this 
means workshops with the participation of a police delegation composed of high-ranking 
representatives of the NPF, international experts, Nigerian academics and practitioners from civil 
society organizations. By way of example, I will give an overview of strategic planning of the design 
and form of the concrete implementation of human rights in the work of police formations. At the 
community level, selected police stations are transformed into “good” police stations as envisaged 
by the European agencies. In order to change their bad public image, the overall aim is to raise 
respect in the local communities. This requires close cooperation with the inhabitants of the 
neighborhood, property owners’ associations, and the informal security providers on the ground. 
Hence, the changes are guided by the holistic idea underlying SSR efforts of including a broad 
array of different local actors (Nathan 2007: 4). As I saw, this often results in a mishmash of 
different projects and aims. Some initiators indicate that they are aiming at effects at the grass 
roots level; others intend to shift thinking about management to a higher level, but also experience 
rejection (author’s field notes). In addition, politicians from the federal government and people in 
charge of police leadership implement reforms, as highlighted above. These different approaches 
coexist without really intertwining. On another level, non-governmental domestic actors, often 
sponsored largely by foundations abroad, must be mentioned in this context20. Furthermore, 
international development agencies cooperate with Nigerian NGOs. This can be seen as a 
problematic relationship because they not only work as consultants but also tend to interfere in 
state issues in various ways. 
 
At a national level, consultations take place between international agencies and high-ranking 
Nigerian institutional leaders and NGOs regarding the mental orientation of police officers and the 
curricula in police colleges. The police force readily enters into agreements (“memorandum of 
understanding”) and collaborates with international organizations in order to gain technical or 
financial support. As indicated earlier, nearly every development agency has a separate program 
with its own scope and feasibility, and these are not centrally coordinated by the Nigerian 
authorities. According to some program consultants’ comments, this overcomplicates gaining an 
overview and coordination with Nigerian partners. One international consultant lamented that 
projects result in uncoordinated activities and do not address “the real issue,” while additionally 
being caught in project cycles that are too short. As another problem he mentioned reluctance on 
the staff’s side that could be overcome by means of an “overarching theoretical framework” within 
the institutions, although such a framework has not been developed up to now. The desire for 
more systematic sensitive coordination is also in accordance with what a European longtime 
observer said, when calling for a total overhaul of the police force’s management: 
 
                                                                
18  The former colonial power has spent a huge budget in this sector and is the donor country that has been active the 
longest in this sector. 
19  During my data collection in 2015, the German GIZ was still in the preparation phase. A new police reform project 
focusing on technical skills for specialists was planned for the period from 2016 to 2019. 
20  Major actors are MacArthur Foundation, Ford Foundation, Open Society Foundations and the United State Institute of 
Peace. 
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“To be honest the embassy is doing work in the police colleges, the prior and [current] 
UNODC want to do work in the police colleges. The Americans want to take people to 
America to police colleges; […] My fear is that all of these uncoordinated activities in the 
police colleges will produce little pockets of good practice that don’t really address the real 
issue. […] How you going to promote it? And how you are going to build a training 
capacity that will still [be] supported from the staff? So, the recruits are coming in and get 
trained in it. But also the people get retrained, the 377,000 [police officers] who went 
through that ridiculous [Nigerian policing] system that they had before. […] I have briefing 
meetings with all sorts of Americans coming in, Germans coming in […] and start working 
on police, but it isn’t gonna solve anything. My view is […] that the work in the justice and 
policing sector has to have a kind of overarching theoretical framework within it [that] can 
work. Otherwise it just becomes little individual interventions that don’t go anywhere. You 
have to have a view about the long term and you have to convince people of the view of the 
long term.” (Interview Pete, Abuja, July 2015). 
 
By taking a step back and considering the national arena, it can be assumed that most participants 
in one workshop held in March 2013 in a hotel in Abuja, are supportive of the general principle of 
promoting human rights and implementing it in the police force in order to enhance human 
security in the context of police work. Although controversial subjects arise during these meetings, 
the majority of those involved in the debate are decision-makers, but do not have any executive 
power. The reason is that these participants come from within the police institutions but not from 
a practical background such as having been police officers on the street. In fact, NGOs and 
minority representatives focus on concrete problems, whereas the planning procedure is 
dominated by the donors’ standards. As a result, the discussions remained at an exclusively 
intellectual level. This is an aspect often criticized by NGOs and human right activists. They 
comment on the police authority’s representatives’ attitude that having (at least) talked about 
reform is a big step forward towards a structural transformation process.  
 
Over almost the past two decades, more and more advocacy NGOs21 have started to emerge in 
public. Some of them emphasize the decline of authoritarian structures and endorse the rebuilding 
of an open and democratic state, promoted in line with the SSR paradigm. A large number of them 
work on a range of topics concerning “security” in general and the protection and promotion of 
“human rights” in particular. Among other things, they proclaim the need for quick problem 
solving, the integration of local strategies and mandates for needy victims of despotism in legal 
proceedings22. At least since the international involvement of development agencies, many 
different actors have been involved, covering different perspectives by formulating expectations 
and proposing methods. In order to improve the accountability of state institutions, the 
government, or more specifically its executive organs, work with Nigerian based NGOs like 
CLEEN (Center for Law Enforcement Education Nigeria) Foundation or the Network on Police 
Reform in Nigeria (NOPRIN). Both organizations enjoy a positive reputation among the NPF and 
in the media for having the courage to be a kind of troublemaker “in a good way.” Their work 
concentrates on partnership with government (to a varying degree) as well as with members of 
civil society concerned with different theoretical and practical issues. Because of the monitoring 
                                                                
21  NOPRIN as a watchdog collects newspaper articles concerning police (mis)behavior and publishes it (e.g., NOPRIN 
2011). Since 2005, academics and civil society organizations have been conducting a national crime victimization 
survey (Alemika/Chukwuma 2011). Through these kinds of activity, the organizations meet the urgent need for 
statistically systematized information/data collection. They want to establish analysis and utilization of the crime and 
victimization survey as essential input into planning, operation and administration.  
22  They espouse human rights in general, women’s and children’s shelter, support for police violence victims, justice 
reform, prison reform, reform of state institutions, are against domestic and sexual violence, etc. 
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that they do, such as regular publications about election security or the nationwide “Police Station 
Visitor’s Week Africa Report” survey published in 2013 (CLEEN Foundation 2013), the NGO is 
generally recognized and well respected. This report provides information collected annually about 
conditions at an average police station. Referring to the NGO’s extensive experience and 
persistence in publishing news about cases of inappropriate behavior by police officers, one person 
described their role as being a necessary representative of the people, who are afraid to raise their 
voice against injustice: 
 
“[When] an ordinary Nigerian would go to the Police, [he/she] would not be able to get that 
person out of that trouble. But when NOPRIN goes, this means quickly, that the 
government, the police is cautious of human rights and what they ought to do. […] But 
here has been some superficially changes in terms of police. They recognize that yes, human 
rights must be respected but that can only happen when you have somebody that can put us 
in trouble: ‘Oh, NOPRIN is not here, ok, that’s it. How much [money] do you have?’ 
(laughing) But, when NOPRIN is there, ‘Oho! But please...’ This is the kind of change that 
we have seen. So the question then is, so if it is not NOPRIN, somebody cannot enjoy his or 
her right, you know.” (Interview NOPRIN, Lagos, March 2013). 
 
This quote refers, on the one hand, to the self-confidence of an NGO activist. It also emphasizes the 
courage needed to draw attention to unpopular issues, hoping to initiate or heat up the debate about 
legal consequences of wrongdoing by those in the executive branch of government. Mostly nationally 
founded but also internationally funded, these organizations act and continuously articulate their 
claims freely and self-confidently to the responsible authorities. But no far-reaching consequences of 
the “lessons learned” within the reform process have yet been implemented by politicians responsible 
for constitutional change or the allocation of the budget (HRW 2010: 99). In the course of several 
meetings, they were open with me and mentioned different occasions when they were at risk of being 
displaced and replaced by the opposite camp. But my impression is that the highly motivated activists 
are sincerely reform-minded and imperturbable. This reveals the fact that some authorities clearly see 
the NGOs’ roles and actions (tendencies to publish police scandals) as a danger possibly leading to 
loss of control over resources. Apart from the Nigerian IGP’s efforts to agree to reform the institution 
in accordance with “best practices” and the global SSR paradigm, international donor agencies 
increasingly appeared in this field and offered their support.  
 
Since 2002, international actors have entered the arena primarily to assist the NPF and other state 
institutions in improving security architecture by designing and implementing specific reform 
projects. They have placed the concept of “human security” at the center of consideration, and 
have focused strongly on human rights education. As mentioned above, a common (and more 
recent) strategy is to setup local projects that rely partly on grassroots movements such as civil 
society organizations (CSO) as implementing partners. Furthermore, some NGOs function as 
mediators in these international cooperation programs. Led by their own policy orientation, 
donors have set different priorities for reforming the police force in terms of international “best 
practices.” These international donors, with the British leading the way, have started assisting in 
the reform programs of the police. They propagate a new approach to overcoming problems of 
mistrust and non-cooperation among civilians, local vigilantes and police representatives by 
following strategies at national as well as local levels. The idea is to restore the public image of the 
police, deliver better service and enhance community partnership, in order to overcome the poor 
relationship between police and people by building up trust23. 
                                                                
23  It is illustrated in a brochure; for more details, see Justice for all (2014). 
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4. EMPIRICAL EXAMPLES 
4.1 Background 
“Community policing” is a global concept based on the ideal of citizen-oriented police work with a 
focus on service instead of a police-centered approach (e.g., armaments used by police). The 
approach’s philosophy is the UK’s, where it has been applied since the 1980s and means “citizen 
participation in security provision” (Kyed 2009: 357; Brogden 2004). The concept requires 
involving “citizens in identifying security problems and solutions by bringing the police closer to 
local communities […] and strengthen the internal coherence of local communities” (Kyed 2009: 
358). Active citizenship is needed in order to be able to assist the police. “Community policing” is a 
popular SSR solution for tackling paramilitary policy solutions and violent crime; for instance it 
was applied in the post-war context of Mozambique (Kyed 2009: 368). Brogden and Nijhar (2005) 
examine the concept as another example of state failure resulting from trying to achieve a 
democratic style of policing. The “traveling model” of “community policing” will be analyzed in 
the broader context of police reform efforts in Nigeria.  
 
Because of the overall pressure of vigilantes and other informal security actors, the idea arose of 
using their potential and shifting it towards a more formal structure, thus strengthening police 
capacity. One crucial concern is the promotion of “community-oriented policing” in order to 
restore good relations between citizens and officers. The British development program targets the 
transformation of police culture, primarily accountability for officers’ performance, which should 
encourage trusting relations with the local population (Hills 2008: 228). A British adviser I talked 
to saw foreign engagement as an opportunity and source of inspiration for his Nigerian colleagues. 
He formulated the ideal type of cooperation as a community-oriented one involving, for example, 
getting in contact with vigilante coordinators, chairs and secretaries as well as local business 
people, who are aware of security weaknesses and needs. On a monthly basis, organized meetings 
between police and community members would bring them closer together and open up a space 
for developing a common solution for security deficiencies (Interview Chris, Abuja, July 2015). 
 
Consequently, in this context Nigerian NGOs have taken over the role of mediators and 
facilitators. The concept was developed to constructively integrate civil society and police work, for 
example with the help of more regulated vigilante groups24. The government’s aim of establishing 
trusting relationships between the police and vigilante groups is challenging. As parallel security 
providers, vigilante formations have mushroomed in many of Nigeria’s cities and towns since the 
promulgation of the democratic constitution, which includes freedom of assembly and the right of 
self-determination (partly on arguments based on ethnicity). For some years, the federal 
government has signaled its support of vigilante groups by providing equipment. Some of their 
members, regarded as police assistants, hoped that in this way the police would work more 
effectively and come under (stricter) control by means of obligatory registration, tracking and 
cooperation in terms of knowledge sharing25. 
 
                                                                
24  Vigilante groups are to work as assistance for local police stations. Normally they take on tasks such as guarding 
property or arresting criminals, whom they then hand over to the police.  
25  The state initiated the association “Vigilante Group of Nigeria.” It can be seen as an attempt to formalize the informal 
character of vigilante groups in order to make them accountable for their activities. Although there had been bans on 
major vigilante groups (O’odua People’s Congress, Bakassi Boys and so on), the government realized that it could not 
prohibit the smaller ones, because they are welcomed by the people. This can be seen as one effort to formalize these 
groups and hold them accountable if necessary or at least to gain an overview of existing groups: e.g., O’odua People’s 
Congress is still active, the members just use another name or hide the name, as in the neighborhood where I used to 
live (author’s field notes, 2016). 
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Thus, Nigeria’s security landscape is characterized nowadays by a multitude of state, semi- and 
parastatal as well as informal security actors, who pursue partly conflicting aims. By demonstrating 
concepts of “good policing” practices and showing where the conflict lines run, both the national 
and the community level will be considered here, in order to show what happens during the 
traveling and translation processes of ideas. By focusing on a strengthening of informal and formal 
actors, the British development experts want to set an example and establish “good” practices that 
are grounded in and supported by the police as well as the society. A British advisor shared an 
interesting personal anecdote with me that he had experienced during his work with Nigerian 
police officers that concerns different meanings of the concept “community policing”: 
 
“The new CP [Commissioner of Police] had gone out to one of the local police stations and 
called in one of the delivery officers and said, ‘I found a television set in the cell, what is it 
doing there?’ And the local station said, ‘Oh, that was recommended by J4A [Justice for all 
Programme] as part of their community policing.’ So the delivery team officer, [who is of 
chief superintendent rank] was able to say: this particular station is not one of the stations 
that J4A or delivery team officers have been working in. You know and certainly he’s been 
working with us now for a good couple of years and J4A do not recommend putting 
televisions sets in the cells!” (Interview Chris, Abuja, July 2015). 
 
This is a vivid example of a “traveling concept” and it is modified locally and takes on a new 
meaning. The concept of human rights is associated with having access to humane treatment as 
well as with the provision of television and “wellness.” Furthermore, it illustrates the different 
understandings of the practice of “better” policing conditions. Some officers obviously linked the 
new paradigm with attributes of “modern” equipment, welfare and comfort for themselves. They 
see this as being represented by the foreign advisors. But the British want them to do the opposite; 
to go out on the street and to explore for themselves, discuss with the people, which is distinct 
from staying in the (safe) “comfort zone” of a station. This shows that the concept of “community 
policing” can be understood and interpreted in opposite ways without touching the deep roots of 
the “police mindset” which influences the behavior. 
4.2 Real-World Examples of “Community Policing” in Lagos  
At the community level in Lagos, NGOs and international expert units26 organize basic knowledge 
transfer and practical training of police work under the umbrella of specific programs. Such formal 
inclusion of informal security actors constitutes an essential part of the rehabilitation of checks and 
balances between the actors involved (police-community-vigilantes) within the framework of 
“community policing.”27 The integration of vigilantes is connected with the intention of shifting 
their role from that of an active, but often illegal, “clean-up” crew to official assistants of the 
authorized Nigeria Police Force. In this context, it is particularly informative to pay attention to 
discourses. I will show what vigilantes do and what they think of the increasing contact with police 
officers and how this influences their everyday work.  
 
One attempt to integrate the concept of “community policing” in the Nigerian environment 
involves introducing “Model Police Stations” (MPS), which are set up in different cities by the 
British development agency DFID and function as a pilot project28. These training goals are 
                                                                
26  Most of them are former, now retired police officers, some of them with a great deal of international experience. 
27  First efforts were made under the rule of President Obasanjo in 2004 (Kasali/Odetola 2016: 103). 
28  DFID supported training and provided equipment and with the “Security, Justice and Growth Programme” from 2002 
until 2010. 
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pursued concretely with the help of courses, workshops for different ranks, theoretical debates 
about human rights manuals for colleges, community-police meetings and model sites to train a 
specific pattern of behavior. The detailed observation highlights the question how the recipients 
and mediators of the programs, such as rank and file police officers, informal security operators, 
members of civil society such as NGO activists and citizens, perceive the impact of these 
interventions. Further, it will show how they discuss (and translate) the “traveling concepts” of 
“good policing,” and how they perceive the newly-embraced theories and practices in their daily 
working routines.  
4.3 “Modeling” or (Re-) Shaping a Police Station 
The Nigerian Model Police Station (MPS) blueprint was developed as a specific strategy in the vast 
field of “community policing” “[…] focusing on answering the needs of the community and 
improving police service standards” (British Council 2017). This intervention for crime prevention 
(as an alternative to reactive practices) was set up by British senior officers and implemented in 
several cities across the country. It aims at establishing victim support and raising awareness of 
gender-based and domestic violence by capacity building and training for officers in crime 
investigation. It also includes the above-mentioned vigilantes, newly labeled “Voluntary Police 
Service” in particular areas, who are overseen by a “community accountability forum” that has the 
task of exposing failures by both sides (British Council 2017)29. 
 
The MPSs are supposed to demonstrate the adoption of international standards in service-oriented 
police work. In short, they are believed to be microcosms, where the assumed reform efforts can be 
observed in a condensed form. Several “model sites” function as “field experiments” and have been 
implemented in specific neighborhoods of Lagos in the past years. Model Police Stations include 
the establishment of new units, such as the family support unit30, or separate rooms for 
interrogations or the provision of extra youth cells31. According to a head of a police station 
(Divisional Police Officer, DPO) – who is widely seen as a good example of implementation of the 
intervention –in contrast to some police officers the community was willing to contribute to the 
improvement of the security situation in their own neighborhood. In doing this, he stressed the 
urgent desire of the citizens to live in a better environment. It clearly shows the difficult situation 
of the poor from the perspective of this DPO: 
 
“The biggest challenge is with the police officers. The community is so appreciating. People 
are used to not getting good quality service, and suddenly you are giving them just a little 
quality to the service, they appreciate, they are so grateful, they are so, they want to partner 
with you, they want to, they are so happy, because they are not used to get anything. It is 
not that they are used to get quality, so if you give it they take it for granted.” (Interview 
DPO Olumide, Lagos, March 2013). 
 
On the one hand, the general population demands an adequate form of policing or request 
assistance; on the other hand, police officers are confronted with this request while not having 
adequate knowledge or equipment.  
                                                                
29  Interestingly it can be stated here that the establishment of CAF meetings was superimposed on an already existing 
structure by the British, which caused confusion. I was told this in several conversations with informal or formal 
security-providing formations such as Neighborhood Watch, Civil Defense and local council representatives (author’s 
field notes, Lagos, June 2015). 
30  These units mostly work in the areas of administration, and family support is done by female officers, which reflects the 
gender roles of the society in the police organization and the institutional identity. 
31  Despite the fact that police officers are at the center of the transformation process, cooperation with non-state actors is 
widely noticed and seen as supportive. 
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Three police stations were selected for this research32. They are located in Nigeria’s economic hub 
and agglomeration area of Lagos, with over 20 million inhabitants. As described above, the police 
officers are trained in how to conduct themselves professionally. The MPSs are operated by the 
Nigerian Police institution itself, which cooperates with civil society actors as mediating partners 
to reach community members. The donors funding the pilot projects equip the police stations, 
provide technical consultants for capacity training and visit regularly for checking purposes. 
Nigerian lawyers and non-state security providers are encouraged to participate in the new 
processes within the MPSs in order to provide legal aid to detainees. 
 
An ordinary Nigerian police station is usually not a place people go to in order to file a complaint. 
As a reason for this, the Nigerians I talked to mentioned the fact that basic infrastructure is missing 
there and that police stations do not enjoy people’s trust33. At the heart of the MPS transformative 
process is the imparting of professional knowledge and social competences to public servants. For 
this reason, selected police officers visit special courses organized and taught by British 
consultants. They receive training in different units about constitutional issues and their practical 
implications (protection of victims, witnesses and suspects). The participants also learn about 
appropriate treatment in cases of gender-based abuse and violence, as well as fair interrogation 
methods (without the use of torture or making bribes). Moreover, specific routines are introduced, 
such as using and regularly maintaining a register daily for documenting events within the station, 
to facilitate communication among the officers and display transparency. This is one of the new 
techniques which are part of the model police training, and it is written documentation for the 
station’s internal communication channels. 
 
In regular meetings on a monthly basis, formal (police officers) as well as informal security actors 
(vigilante members) and members of the public are brought together (at a neutral place such as a 
community hall or a hotel) to get to know each other and to discuss problems of security, 
communication gaps or human rights violations on the officers’ side openly. The implied idea is 
establishing a forum for the exchange of different opinions among the actors involved, enhancing 
transparency and uncovering things which go wrong (e.g., human rights violations or corruption). 
This kind of mutual feedback is intended to strengthen the new partnerships and cooperation. It 
entails teamwork and mutual information sharing between vigilantes and police officers and is led 
by an NGO, which receives part of its funding from international donors. The task of the partners 
is to report on current issues, such as what has happened and how they worked it out. 
“Community accountability forums” are open spaces for discussion among all actors and are 
organized by NGOs and international agencies’ representatives. The NGOs invite all relevant 
actors in a specific neighborhood to provide space to discuss what is going on freely, such as to 
praise events and persons as well as to make accusations of offences. Here, local crime prevention 
is in the foreground. The purpose of establishing such a forum is to encourage a more trusting 
atmosphere that enables the exchange of information without fear of negative consequences. 
 
A further part of the “Model Police Station” approach is in-service training for police officers, 
which is provided by international senior officers. Common topics are again basic information 
about human rights, investigative skills or a sensitive approach to victims. The purpose is to fill 
education gaps within the NPF and to prepare the officers adequately for the new working 
requirements. I participated in a two-week-training for police officers who were in the phase of 
                                                                
32  The selection criteria were on the one hand being in a transformation process and on the other hand the involvement 
of internationals and NGOs. 
33  However, citizens use it to push their own interests and do not hesitate to bribe the officers and denounce them at the 
same time for being dishonest. 
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preparation for deployment in another model site in Lagos. The interactive course was divided into 
theoretical and practical parts covering proper recording of statements, witness hearings, 
description of suspects, body checks, house searches and proper gathering of evidence. Respectful 
treatment of victims and suspects were key points on the agenda. 
 
How do police officers perceive these training courses? During the courses and on other occasions, 
police officers of different ranks expressed an increasing awareness of the importance of human 
rights; yet they criticized their applicability. Many of the Nigerians interviewed regarded these 
rights as not fully compatible with their working conditions. In fact, the British officers introduced 
ideas and concepts which were obviously interesting and somehow new for the Nigerian officers, 
but the latter also stated the fundamental problem they had with the course: the approaches 
suggested did not seem like they could be put into practice at their stations, because there 
individual police officers are required to respect orders received from their superiors and cannot 
independently start to follow different guidelines. It also became obvious that the course contents 
had not been designed in a way that took the everyday work setting of Nigerian police officer into 
consideration. The consultant in charge told me that a similar course was regularly being 
conducted in the UK over a period of six weeks (Interview John, Lagos, July 2015). The one in 
Nigeria was a downgraded workshop because of the time limitations that arose from the donor’s 
agenda. In spite of the poor level of directly or indirectly expressed satisfaction on both sides, the 
program was to be continued for at least the rest of the agreed funding period. 
Policing in an Area of Tension  
Some police officers were unable to cope with the new requirements without clear and sustainable 
backing from the institution itself. As they do not receive a regular or a full monthly salary and 
have no budget for working materials, they frankly admitted that they expected so-called “little 
presents” from the complainants or suspects in order to be able to work at all. This means them 
having the material and being able to take notes on a complaint, to visit a crime scene or a suspect, 
to buy fuel for the car, or to have money for public transport. Obviously, the Nigerian police 
officers find themselves in a state of tension between established routines and the new ideals. 
According to the police officers’ own statements, they knew that it is illegitimate to take money 
from people; but, because they are still working in the same environment under the same 
(deficient) conditions, they do not see how they can change their habits in the long run. However, 
due to the regular transfers of (SSR-) trained police officers to other stations, which prevent 
sustainable change, the knowledge disappears from an MPS. 
 
In addition to the administrative structure, one reason for this can be seen in the state of affairs 
where the head of a station does not agree with the new policy, which is to be practiced in his 
station. According to British consultants, the force’s frequently changing personnel impedes 
development of personal relationships to people in decision-making (high ranking) positions. 
Politically active domestic critics share this judgement that international training courses merely 
superficially correct deficiencies without touching the institutional problems of the police force at 
all. Staff members at the rank and file level are dependent on the good will of their superiors, 
whose commitment to the aims of “community policing” can be of varying strength and involve 
different modes of interpretation. The usefulness is also dependent on the crime patterns prevalent 
in a specific neighborhood and on the resources available to police personnel. 
 
Knowledge transfer about new policing methods and concepts can be seen as a “traveling model.” 
Transfer functions here as a vehicle with an unintended positive effect. There are not many highly 
enthusiastic officers but they exist (Hills 2012: 750). I got to know one DPO who was very special 
in terms of his leadership qualities and other capacities, which seem to be an uncommon feature. 
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Over the whole period of my fieldwork I met him several times in his areas of operation. He is in 
favor of the British advisers who work on site. In their eyes he performs wonderfully and is seen as 
a “golden nugget” in the thicket of the police force’s crowd. Thanks to a brief conversation during 
a car breakdown, I learned about the diverging views on this DPO. While I had already recognized 
the positive views of his person and character by the British advisers, community members as well 
as vigilantes and some officers, during the minor accident I was told about him by three of his 
subordinates, who were escorting my companions and me. In their opinion, their boss was 
arrogant because he wanted to impose his specific modus operandi that did not match the previous 
way of doing things in the station, which they preferred. On another occasion the DPO also 
mentioned that he felt physically and psychologically threatened by his colleagues’ behavior: He 
had already faced murder attempts and had to cope with fake applications (for transfer) which 
were issued in his name and sent to the authorities. In addition to this, one of his superiors seemed 
to envy his good and close relationships (accompanied by support) with the residents of the 
neighborhoods around the police stations where he used to work34. This shows the divergence of 
perceptions concerning the newly introduced “good” patterns and guidelines on how to behave as 
a police officer and the obstacles for individuals to their mission to press ahead with reform at the 
lower levels. Although the idea of improved police work is in the mind of some people on the spot, 
this does not mean that it is easily transferable to other members’ work and life situations in the 
same institution. 
 
After this survey of the training and mixed appreciation of the transfer of norms, everyday 
practices will now be examined more closely. During my fieldwork I met some of the police 
officers at their workplace and discussed the experiences they had had in terms of theory and 
practice. Cooperation between police and vigilante groups formed one part of the initiative; I was 
also interested in assessments of this change from the perspective of both groups (police and 
vigilantes). But how to do that? For this purpose, I went to one of the neighborhoods in Lagos 
characterized by low levels of income and having a mixed ethnic and religious background. The 
city district is known for its population of recently arrived migrants35 (e.g., from northern Nigeria 
or other West African countries such as Mali) and is a half market, half residential area, and very 
densely populated. One major problem, according to traders, vigilante members and police officers 
and other people I spoke with there, is the “area boys” (or street urchins), unemployed youth who 
hang around looking for something to do36. Most of them are young unemployed and uneducated 
men who come to Lagos from all parts of the country or neighboring countries hoping to get a job. 
According to the vigilantes I met, most of them fail and slide down the ladder and find themselves 
involved in criminal activities. They gather in the neighborhood, are said to take drugs and disturb 
the social and economic lives of the inhabitants and traders, and tend to commit crimes on a daily 
basis by stealing goods from shops and harassing people.  
 
Another police station I frequently visited, though interested in the idea, was not directly part of 
the program. It has more the function of a replication site, where new ideas circulate but are not 
fully implemented and serve rather as a stimulus. Consequently, ideas on better methods of 
policing were discussed here as well. The staff members had not attended any courses and had only 
                                                                
34  This became apparent to me on several occasions, e.g., when residents’ delegations (elders) from his former policing 
areas made a long journey to pay him a personal visit and to bring him a present, or when people in his previous sphere 
of activity still sang his praises. 
35  It is similar to what Le Bas describes in her study of vigilantes in Nairobi and Kenya (2013: 241). 
36  Since 2015 a new law for migrants from other states has been in existence in Lagos state. It specifies that if they are new 
in Lagos state they need an accommodation registry and a certificate of employment. If they do not have these papers 
they can be detained for three months, and if they are detected by the police a second time, they have to be deported, a 
DPO told me. 
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occasionally gained some knowledge through meetings. Occasionally they receive support and 
absorb some knowledge from the above-mentioned police station through personal contacts with 
police officers and vigilante chairpersons who are responsible for a relatively large area, and they 
frequently share information in informal ways. This station in the larger Bikare area is different 
from the others; it is smaller, a single-story house in a spacious courtyard with small, narrow 
rooms functioning as offices. At the time of my visit the entrance area was under construction; 
bags of cement and different tools were lying around, and it was dusty everywhere. The DPO who 
welcomed me told me that some vigilantes had offered to help renovate because the following week 
they expected a high-ranking officer to come for a visit. During an event called “Open Day,” it was 
possible to see the cells, which were accessible through a separate door that led to the courtyard. In 
an interview another day, the same DPO told me that “community policing” is promising but in 
terms of personnel and costs (to rent an extra car and pay for fuel) too intensive as a policing 
method. Again, this provides evidence of the dilemma of the police officers, who are motivated and 
willing to connect to the public but are at the same time trapped in financial constraints because 
the funding they receive from police headquarters in Abuja is too low. 
Mediating as a(n) (Inevitable) Tactic for Solving Criminal Cases 
There are heterogeneous methods police officers choose in order to integrate or selectively adopt 
the new ideas in their everyday work. One day when I was on patrol with officers, two men in their 
twenties were accused of theft in the shop where they worked. As police were unable to take 
fingerprints or collect any other evidence, the men were brought to the police station in order to 
solve the problem. While they were in the interrogation room both suspects were frightened by the 
decision made by the officers that they had to pay back the money to the owner in equal shares, 
screaming and crying and obviously demonstrating their helplessness. The young men, who were 
obviously not mature, seemed to be desperate. The tide turned after the elderly shopkeeper finally 
decided to withdraw his demand for repayment, warned them and gave them a last chance to 
continue working in his shop after inconclusive discussions. This kind of police behavior shows 
how the process of clearing up a criminal case may lead to more or less pragmatic solutions to 
everyday problems. Because of the officers’ inability to take evidence at the crime scene they 
decided to return with the person affected to the station to settle the problem verbally. But this lack 
of resources is not really perceived as a deficiency. Instead, officers see themselves as more like 
mediators, who build on the good will of the aggrieved party. In this case the shop owner was 
willing – after a tough and unpromising discussion without getting any further than mutual 
accusations and insults –to leave the case unsolved. 
 
Although citizens seek help at the police station, the officers are sometimes incapable of providing 
it – as is the case elsewhere in the world. In Nigeria people are highly dependent on finding their 
own solutions, whether this occurring in the police station, in the community hall, or at home. 
Informal Security Providers’ Perspectives on New Policing Practices 
As a consequence of the different mode of functional logic of the Nigerian police institution and in 
response to military despotism, people formed militias and vigilante groups, which act in the place 
of the state and deliver security services (Harnischfeger 2003). These so-called unstable 
organizations focus on “social control in the form of providing security to participants and 
members of the established orders” (Buur 2004: 141). Often, they serve the interests of specific 
groups (financial, political, etc.) and can work against the state (Buur 2004: 141). Lund (2007) 
describes them as “twilight institutions” because the distinction between when, who and what is 
representing the state is often unclear. In Nigeria, some of the actors used to be members of 
paramilitary groups (which have in the meantime become illegal), such as in the Southeast Niger 
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Delta, where they were known as Bakassi Boys, or in the Southwest as the O’odua People’s 
Congress. These vigilante groups exist virtually everywhere and enjoy – unlike police officers – a 
quite positive image in Nigerian society. Apart from this difference, some technical infrastructure 
such as equipment necessary for daily use is often provided by the inhabitants, by local leaders, 
business people and associations of different kinds (property owners, traders, market women, 
commercial motor bikers, taxi drivers) who thus make it possible for the vigilantes to work 
effectively. However, the parallelism of state and informal security providers sometimes causes 
competition and clashes. To prevent such competition the informal actors are supposed to become 
involved in the ongoing police reform projects. 
 
Hence, one aspect of “community policing” is also to build up a reliable working partnership 
between police officers and local vigilante groups, who actually protect the life and property of the 
people within their neighborhoods. Vigilante members and police officers are supposed to work 
together, each of them in their own domain: The vigilantes have deep knowledge of the specific 
environment and are supposed to act in a preventive and observant manner. They are seen as a 
welcome supplement to the police in controlling the area. One DPO formulates the ambivalent 
situation this way: 
 
“The vigilantes are a very useful tool. I find out from Amolede I discovered they are useful 
in policing. If you have vigilante[s] who are well trained that are patrolling an area with two 
policemen, you get the same quality you would get from 12 policemen patrolling. So, it 
helps us in terms of manpower problems and it is also very important because the vigilantes 
are members of the community and they know. […] And they get information better than 
police, because the people feel more confident with them, so they get better information 
and the vigilante[s], you know when we partner together like that and they are patrolling 
together, we find that the criminals themselves feel intimidated because they feel they 
cannot hide anything. If so and so person who know me very well, I am now a part of the 
security system in that area. […] The challenge is one: Emmanuel [an NGO activist] said if 
you work with vigilante[s] and you know them very well, you cannot control [them]. […] 
So, there is tendency that they will abuse the powers. Sometimes if they are not properly 
trained and monitored, they can even attack a criminal.” (Interview DPO Olumide, Lagos, 
March 2013). 
 
The interviewee vividly illustrates the two-edged character of chance and risk inherent in the 
deployment of vigilantes. Assuming that they act in a popularly-accepted manner, the police 
officers’ role would be to prosecute. As my informant said, not all of the police officers are content 
with the changed requirements of their new role (author’s field notes). Within the framework of 
the new policing ideas, the outreach strategy of involving informal security providers was to clarify 
roles, so that teamwork could become possible, at least under certain conditions. An important 
factor here is the formalized integration of vigilante groups as assistance to the police. Vigilantes 
work on a voluntary basis and are said to not be corrupt. They form small and locally active night 
guards. In the neighborhoods where I went, they work in the night, mostly from 10 pm to 6 am, 
and anyone who is walking outdoors (at the market or through the streets of the neighborhood) 
during this time is a suspect. The night guards enjoy trust and receive support from the inhabitants 
within the neighborhood. As I had been told, they also partly distinguish themselves from the 
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police because they apply “juju” (a sort of magic) to protect themselves from danger and to bewitch 
potential criminals in order to weaken them (author’s field notes)37. 
 
For security reasons, the vigilantes did not allow me to accompany them during the night, because 
they could not guarantee my personal safety. Consequently, we went on patrol together during the 
comparatively low-risk daytime. They explained to me which routes they take and what kinds of 
experience they had had in the past. We stopped in front of the local leader’s (Baale) house38 and 
other relevant places, such as at a former meeting spot for area boys, which has been transformed 
into a meeting place for all inhabitants of the neighborhood. They stated that it was to the credit of 
the vigilantes that this public space had been recaptured for ordinary (non-criminal) citizens. 
Other places on our way through the neighborhood were mosques, schools, the house of “a big 
woman”, who is also a herbalist and well accepted within the community.39 Her house was neatly 
and freshly painted and differed from the others in its size and upkeep. It is obvious to anybody 
who passes by that she is a rich person, but still lives in this so-called low-income (slum) 
neighborhood because she sees herself as having a responsibility and perhaps also as an important 
part of the community. She is one of the most generous persons living there and sometimes 
supports the vigilantes financially. 
 
While walking on, the vigilantes told me they enjoyed great support from community members, even 
receiving information gathered passively by elders. They were, for instance, able to buy and install an 
iron door to lock up a popular escape route for thieves40. In this neighborhood, the relationship 
between the vigilantes and the police officers was described as cordial on both sides, but the vigilantes 
also mentioned the instability of this kind of partnership with the police. They expressed their 
dissatisfaction in a cautious way. As they said, it depended on the priorities individually set by the 
particular DPO in office. While the former DPO Olumide had been very cooperative, had 
approached them proactively by asking for their opinion, and built up trust step by step, the current 
DPO Chinedu, who had been in office for a year, had not yet come to their neighborhood or reached 
out in any other way. This reveals some of the negative effects of the high fluctuation of personnel in 
the police system and differences in their character and priorities respectively, which can be seen as 
pivotal in terms of creating an atmosphere of working partnership. 
5 ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
As I showed in the previous section, police work on the ground is a multi-faceted undertaking. 
Examples of “good policing” are in place. As a result of lack of resources including technical 
equipment and, by implication, lack of gathered evidence and possibilities for forensic analysis, 
motivated police officers try to work in the interest of the public by offering reliable security. In 
practical terms this means disrupting and dispersing criminal activity in the particular 
neighborhood. Parts of the “traveling concept” of “community policing” are adapted, for instance 
                                                                
37  In the context of building trust, the aspect of believing in charms plays a significant role, which should not be 
underestimated, but this is not a focus of interest of this study. 
38  This is a Yoruba leader, who is subordinate to the Olu of Bikare (local king). They organize their own security 
provisions and have ‘gatekeepers’/informants from every ethnic group in the neighborhood, who report to the local 
authorities and are held responsible for crimes committed by their members. Normally they try to solve disputes in the 
neighborhood without a trial, but with police interaction to find a solution. 
39  The term “big” in this context means wealthy and influential in the community. Rich persons sometimes sponsor 
vigilantes generously or distribute money to their neighbors. 
40  During the interviews and several informal talks I recognized strong solidarity among the vigilante members; they 
included each other and allowed everyone to speak. Furthermore, they never met me alone, in order to show their 
consensus-based group mentality. This was different when I was in contact with police officers, who seemed to be lone 
fighters in their stations or as heads of units and presented themselves more as individuals. 
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the more community-related approaches such as more friendly communication in answering 
civilians’ requests for help. Case solving is mostly reduced to mediating between the parties to the 
disputes and can reach a consensus as a result of the officers’ facilitating a dialogue, as Beek and 
Göpfert (2015) substantiate in their studies of the Ghanaian and Nigerien Police. The intended 
cooperative work between informal and formal security providers functions under specific 
conditions, which rarely exist. The Lagos state governor’s initiative to establish a trust fund can be 
seen as an “endogenous” innovation (Feil 1994) contrasting with foreign interventions, which is 
obviously more sustainable in some regards. The trust fund idea and, even more importantly, the 
ongoing practice of increasing acceptance within the police force of reform measures are included. 
 
Many different police reform efforts are taking place in Nigeria at different levels. A variety of actors 
with different expectations and ambitions are involved. However, there is no national effort to 
establish a coordinated strategy, projects are implemented independently of each other, and most 
development agencies are not interested in working closely together because each follows its own 
national agenda, which can vary widely in terms of approach, methods and outcomes. The fact that 
designing and programming are largely in the hands of external donors is not an obstacle per se. The 
NPF appreciates the approaches because of the funding and training opportunities they provide. 
However, fundamental institutional backing is lacking, so that no sustainable change is achieved. 
 
Parts of the SSR projects conducted in Nigeria only function within a limited time frame in 
detached environments that are created for the purpose of training, such as the policing skills 
courses41. Intended reforms may not be as effective as expected in the selected model sites and their 
associated environments. Nonetheless, they are sometimes effective beyond that, as I have shown 
with the example of the loved and hated DPO and his “mission” to convert the NPF by 
transporting ideas to different places with unintended but (partly) positive impact. In Nigeria I can 
identify hesitant acts of adaption and translation. The reform ideas have effects not only in the 
model sites, but also beyond the original scope. There are several reasons for individual or 
collective negotiation processes. It does not make sense for the police officers to be taught about 
the rule of law as long as they see themselves as victims of arbitrary despotism within the existing 
hierarchy of the force.  
 
Practical respect for human rights is thus highly dependent on the individuals’ personal convictions 
and their own professional ethics, which are formed by different sources of influence and experience. 
Human rights remain more or less a theoretical concept, which plays no role in everyday life. What is 
more, knowledge of “good practice” is specific to individuals – particularly open and engaged – who 
are frequently redeployed to different stations. It is thus not only too abstract to become a central part 
of daily routine but also disappears from given settings as a result of staff fluctuation. Training and 
development of a few exemplary model stations cannot solve the problem, because the idea is not 
adapted or integrated into the highest ranks as desired by donors. Although theoretical knowledge 
about human rights may in some way be retained, it cannot acquire practical relevance as long as the 
institutions’ organizational culture and mindset are not fundamentally changed from inside. This 
problem of an institution that implements policy incoherently – and has an effect on the justice 
sector, too – needs to be addressed from above and from within. Ideas from the international donor 
agencies are openly rejected or serve as a motivational effect for individuals’ decision-making. With 
its vibrant and democratically committed civil society, Nigeria offers good preconditions for a 
comprehensive endeavor by having experienced experts and practitioners on the ground. Many 
                                                                
41  Although many police officers who attend courses welcome the new concepts and appreciate the consideration of 
human rights, as soon as they are back in their usual environments old routines gain the upper hand again. 
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aspects of everyday life in Nigeria are self-organized, basic security provisions for at least those who 
can afford it included. Despite this apparently chaotic outlook, individuals and collectives have the 
capacity to build a diversity of security architectures and arrangements on their own. What the 
visiting experts aim to achieve does not – on the whole – meet what the people and officers on the 
ground need most. The creativity and power of the Trust Fund team’s idea offers new possibilities 
without development agencies’ involvement, and provides an independent way of thinking about and 
adjusting to the delivery of security arrangements and demand-driven requirements in the complex 
Nigerian context. 
 
Additionally, I have discussed the question of whether the ideas of the British were useful or not, 
and how to determine this? I conclude that ideas originating in Britain are partly helpful and partly 
not. Ideas imported from the “West” can serve as a stimulus but they are set in the field of tensions 
between paternalism and facilitation, as described by Mannitz (2017); for even if ideas "travel" 
(Kaufmann/Rottenburg 2012) from one space to another within the globalized world, they take on 
different meanings while travelling: For example, police officers’ new knowledge of soft skills such 
as for instance how to treat a suspect or victim according to human rights norm. New soft skills 
may facilitate already existing consensus-based problem solving among different parties, but does 
not achieve bottom-up change42. If, on the other hand, measures are only taken in specific parts of 
the system, they run the risk of influencing even well-functioning existing arrangements. The 
effort to integrate vigilante groups into cooperative structures is one example: these informal 
security providers display uncertainty within their new roles and the shift in relations with the state 
police force that was envisaged. The intended formalization of their status places them at risk of 
losing trustworthy relationships they currently have and may become less resistant to corruption. 
This is one reason why the laboriously established, so-called “partnership” between the police and 
its volunteer assistants is highly fragile and functionally endangered43. 
  
                                                                
42  Apart from the initiative on the state level, Nigeria has other sources of inspiration/development such as the diaspora, 
which is used to create a Nigerian way of policing. 
43  Police officers are at the same time a source of conflict and providers of security. I saw close ties between local leaders 
and DPOs. They share the common aim of making the environment safe, but have different priorities. To look more 
closely at a third party implied in this, it would be interesting to conduct research on the state-based Community 
Development Associations (CDA), coordinating and overseeing different security providers in their respective areas.  
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INDEX OF ABBREVIATIONS 
CDA Community Development Associations 
CLEEN Center for Law Enforcement Education Nigeria 
DFID (British) Department for International Development 
DPO Divisional Police Officer (Head of Station) 
HRW Human Rights Watch 
IGP Inspector General of Police (Head of the Police Force) 
J4A Justice for all Programme 
LSSTF Lagos State Security Trust Fund 
MPS Model Police Station 
NGO Non-Governmental Organization 
NOPRIN Network on Police Reform in Nigeria 
NPF Nigeria Police Force 
LIST OF PERSONS INTERVIEWED 
Chris, Abuja, July 2015 
DPO Olumide, Lagos, March 2013 
Executive Secretary LSSTF, Lagos, July 2015 
John, Lagos, July 2015 
NOPRIN, Lagos, March 2013 
Pete, Abuja, July 2015 
Taiwo, Lagos, March 2013 
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